Dawn of a New Era in the Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Environmental Statutes: A Proposal for an Integrated Judicial Standard Based on the Continuum of Context by Abate, Randall S.
Florida A&M University College of Law
Scholarly Commons @ FAMU Law
Journal Publications Faculty Works
2006
Dawn of a New Era in the Extraterritorial
Application of U.S. Environmental Statutes: A
Proposal for an Integrated Judicial Standard Based
on the Continuum of Context
Randall S. Abate
Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University College of Law, randall.abate@famu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.law.famu.edu/faculty-research
Part of the Environmental Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Works at Scholarly Commons @ FAMU Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Journal Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons @ FAMU Law. For more information, please contact
linda.barrette@famu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Randall S. Abate, Dawn of a New Era in the Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Environmental Statutes: A Proposal for an Integrated
Judicial Standard Based on the Continuum of Context, 31 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 87 (2006)
Dawn of a New Era in the Extraterritorial
Application of U.S. Environmental Statutes:
A Proposal for an Integrated Judicial




I. Origins and Evolution of the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality ..................................................................... 90
A. Historical and Conceptual Foundations of the Presumption. 91
B. The Aramco Decision ............................................................. 95
C. Inconsistent Trends in Applying the Presumption After Aramco
.............................................................................................. 9 7
1. Supreme Court Decisions ................................................ 98
2. Division in the Lower Federal Courts ................................. 100
II. Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Environmental Statutes ... 102
A. Recognition of the Continuum of Context in Massey ............ 103
B. Massey's Continuum of Context Applied to the Extraterritorial
Application of Environmental Statutes .................................. 104
1. Foreign Sovereign Territories ............................................. 105
a. RCRA-Amlon Metals (Foreign Sovereign Lands) ........... 106
b. CERCLA-ARC Ecology (Foreign Sovereign Lands) ....... 108
c. MMPA-Mitchell (Foreign Sovereign Waters) ................. 111
2. Contexts in Which the U.S. Has Some Control .................. 113
a. NEPA (Antarctica and the EEZ) ...................................... 114
b. ESA (Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife) ................................... 117
III. The Future of the Extraterritorial Application of U.S.
Environmental Statutes: Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals and
Friends of the Earth v. W atson ......................................................... 120
* Legal Writing Faculty, Rutgers School of Law-Camden. B.A., University of Rochester;
J.D., M.S.E.L., Vermont Law School. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of
Lauren Brantz andJim Green in preparing this Article.
COLUMBIAJOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. CERCLA Extraterritoriality: Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals. 120
1. Factual O rigins of the Dispute ............................................. 120
2. The District Court's O pinion .............................................. 123
3. Parties' Arguments on Appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of
A p p eals ..................................................................................... 123
B. NEPA Extraterritoriality: Friends of the Earth v. Watson ........... 124
1. Factual Origins of the Dispute ............................................. 124
2. Parties' Arguments to the District Court ............................ 125
3. The District Court's Opinion .............................................. 128
IV. A Proposal for the Extraterritorial Application of U.S.
Environmental Statutes Based on the Continuum of Context.. 130
A. The Territorial Context: Transboundary Disputes and Foreign
Sovereign A reas ....................................................................... 131
B. The Non-Territorial Context: Global Commons Areas and the
E E Z ........................................................................................... 135
C on clu sion ....................................................................................... 137
INTRODUCTION
Congress has the authority to enact laws beyond the territorial
boundaries of the United States.' However, whether Congress
intended to exercise extraterritorial authority in a given statute is a
matter for the courts to ascertain through statutory interpretation.2
When considering the reach of federal legislation, courts are
guided by a presumption against extraterritoriality. This
presumption guards against the extraterritorial application of U.S.
laws, unless one of three narrow exceptions is met. The application
of this presumption by courts in cases addressing the
extraterritorial application of U.S. statutes has yielded inconsistent
outcomes. This inconsistency is evident both in cases before and
after the Supreme Court's landmark 1991 decision in Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian American Oil Co.
("Aramco") . Cases involving the extraterritorial application of
environmental statutes are not immune from this inconsistency.
Two significant cases pending in 2006 offer an opportunity to
1. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (The Constitution grants Congress broad powers "to
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations").
2. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248
(1991).
3. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
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clarify under what circumstances the extraterritorial application of
U.S. environmental statutes is appropriate. The first, Pakootas v.
Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd.,4 involves the extraterritorial application of
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA).5 The second, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Watson," concerns the extraterritorial application of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).'
These two cases should be seen as representing different points
along the continuum of territories, a concept first identified in
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey." The court in Massey used
the concept of a continuum of territories to describe the
circumstances in which an environmental statute could be applied
extraterritorially. At one end of the continuum is the United
States-in which U.S. statutes naturally should apply-and at the
other end are sovereign foreign nations." A U.S. statute must
contain clear legislative intent to apply in foreign sovereign
nations. In the middle of the continuum are "global commons,
" 12
areas in which a court may or may not apply the presumption
against extraterritorial application, depending on additional
foreign policy concerns.
The application of this continuum of territories analysis to these
two Ninth Circuit cases and future cases involving the
extraterritorial application of U.S. environmental laws is important
for two reasons. First, the application of an integrated judicial
standard based on the continuum of context will act to remedy the
inconsistent treatment these cases currently receive in lower federal
courts.
Second, international environmental law lacks adequate
enforcement mechanisms and needs the aggressive protection that
U.S. environmental laws can offer for enhanced protection of
global commons resources. Environmental problems do not
4. No. 05-35153 (9th Cir. filed Feb. 24, 2005).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000).
6. No. C 02-410JSW, 2005 WL 2035596 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4375 (2000).
8. 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
9. Id. at 533.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 531 (quoting Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248).
12. 986 F.2d at 534. Global commons areas addressed in this Article are Antarctica, the
high seas, and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Each context involves areas over which
the United States has some measure of legislative control.
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recognize geopolitical boundaries. Consequently, a burgeoning
body of international environmental law has emerged to address
this reality in a largely cooperative framework. However, despite
their ambitious and well-intentioned objectives, international
environmental legal instruments are plagued by ineffective
enforcement mechanisms, which often expose the vulnerable
environmental resources in question to continued degradation.
International environmental law has not, however, trumped the
need for extraterritorial application of U.S. laws to protect the
environment. If anything, the need for extraterritorial application
of U.S. environmental laws is greater now than ever before.
Application of U.S. environmental laws beyond U.S. territorial
boundaries under appropriate circumstances can be an
indispensable weapon in fulfilling the goal of meaningful
environmental protection on a global scale.
Part I of this Article discusses the origins and evolution of the
presumption against extraterritoriality before and after the
landmark decision in Aramco. It explores how the presumption has
been applied in a variety of economic contexts and also considers
different approaches to the applicability of the presumption. Part II
addresses the continuum of context paradigm from Massey and
describes the extraterritorial application of U.S. environmental
statutes in two contexts: 1) disputes concerning foreign sovereign
lands and waters, and 2) disputes concerning the protection of the
global commons and resources in the Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) of the United States.
Part III of the Article addresses two cases that will help define the
future of the extraterritorial application of U.S. environmental
laws: the extraterritorial application of CERCLA in Pakootas v. Teck
Cominco Metals, Ltd., and the extraterritorial application of NEPA in
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson. Part IV draws on the continuum
of context paradigm discussed in Part II and argues that the
extraterritorial application of CERCLA is inappropriate because of
sovereignty concerns as evident in Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals,
Ltd. Conversely, the analysis in Part IV supports the extraterritorial
application of NEPA in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson as an
effective and appropriate avenue to protect the Earth's atmosphere
by providing a procedural check on the impacts from sources that
contribute to climate change.
I. ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST
[Vol. 31:1
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EXTRATERRITORIALITY
The presumption against extraterritoriality has existed for nearly
as long as there have been federal statutes. 13 Throughout this
extensive history, however, the extraterritorial application of U.S.
statutes has been inconsistent. 4 Judicial interpretation of the
presumption has shifted from denying almost all extraterritorial
applications of statutes because of foreign affairs concerns, to
employing the presumption against extraterritoriality absent an
express statement to the contrary from Congress, to the current
inconsistent state of the presumption-a presumption against
extraterritoriality, with many exceptions.''
A. Historical and Conceptual Foundations of the Presumption
The first reported case to discuss the potential extraterritorial
reach of a federal statute was the 1804 case of Murray v. The Schooner
Charming Betsy.16 In Murray, the U.S. Navy seized "the Charming
Betsy" on the high seas because it suspected the ship of engaging in
trade with Guadaloupe in violation of the Nonintercourse Act of
1800. The Act prohibited trade "between any person or persons
resident within the United States or under their protection, and
any person or persons resident within the territories of the French
Republic, or any of the dependencies thereof.'' 7 Before being
seized, the ship had been sold by its American owner to a resident
of St. Thomas, Jared Shattuck. Shattuck was born in the United
States, but had moved to St. Thomas, a Danish island, and had
become a Danish citizen. He had not, however, expressly
renounced his American citizenship.
In evaluating Shattuck's challenge to the seizure of his vessel, the
Court had to determine whether the Navy had properly applied the
Act to Shattuck. Shattuck contended that applying the Act to him
13. See William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16
BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 85 (1998).
14. See Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome": Mulitnational Misconduct and the Presumption
Against Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 598, 600-02 (1998).
15. Jennifer M. Siegle, Suing U.S. Corporations in Domestic Courts for Environmental Wrongs
Committed Abroad Through the Extraterritorial Application of Federal Statutes, 10 U. MIAMI. Bus. L.
REv. 393, 397 (2002).
16. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
17. Id. at 77 (quoting Federal Nonintercourse Act, ch. 10, § 1, 2 Stat. 7, 8 (1800) (expired
1801).
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would violate the "rights of neutrality" under international law.1
8
The Court agreed and refused to punish Shattuck.' 9 The Court
held that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate
the law of nations if any other possible construction remains. '0
A century after Murray, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
presumption against extraterritoriality in American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co. 2' by applying the presumption to limit the Sherman
Antitrust Act to anticompetitive conduct within the United States.
The case involved a dispute between an American banana exporter
and a Panamanian importer who seized the American exporter's
plantation in Panama. 3 In holding that the provisions of the
Sherman Antitrust Act did not apply extraterritorially, Justice
Holmes noted that "the general and almost universal rule is that
the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined
wholly by the law of the country where the act is done."24 Justice
Holmes further noted that this "general and almost universal" rule
"would lead, in case of doubt, to a construction of any statute as
intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial
limits over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power.,,25
The Supreme Court also has applied the presumption against
extraterritoriality to labor laws. In Foley Bros. v. Filardo,26 the
Supreme Court denied relief to an American who sought overtime
pay for work performed outside of the United States for an
American employer. 7 The Court concluded that the U.S. wage and
hour laws did not extend to work performed on foreign soil.2 s The
Court identified three factors to consider in determining whether
to apply a federal law extraterritorially: 1) whether the language of
the statute in question provided any indication that Congress
18. Id. at 107.
19. Id. at 118.
20. Id. The Supreme Court also applied the presumption in the early nineteenth century
to limit the reach of federal customs and piracy laws. See generally The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824) (Story, J.) (customs laws); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3
Wheat.) 610, 630-32 (1818) (Marshall, CJ.) (piracy laws).
21. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
22. Id. at 357.
23. Id. at 354.
24. Id. at 357.
25. Id. This reasoning came to be known as the "territorial" approach to the
presumption.
26. 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
27. Id. at 280, 283.
28. Id. at 285, 287-90.
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intended to apply the statute extraterritorially; 2) whether the
legislative history evinced congressional intent to apply the statute
extraterritorially; and 3) whether the pertinent administrative
interpretations of the statute, if they exist, reveal congressional
intent to extend the statute's reach.0 After Foley, lower federal
courts applied the presumption to other federal laws, such as the
Federal Tort Claims Act
3 and environmental protection laws.
31
However, the presumption was applied less consistently as the
twentieth century wore on. For example, in Steele v. Bulova Watch
Co.,32 the only Supreme Court case to address the extraterritoriality
of the Lanham Act, the Court held that watches assembled and
affixed with the offending "Bulova" trademark in Mexico, and
subsequently sold without the authorization of the plaintiff
company, constituted a violation of the Act.33 The Court read the
statute broadly and held that the United States could enact laws
that governed its own citizens, even if the actions of those citizens
took place in another country, as long as such actions did not
encroach upon another country's sovereignty.
3 4
As early as the 1920's, courts began to state exceptions and
develop alternatives to the presumption. The Supreme Court and
lower federal courts began to ignore the American Banana holding
in antitrust cases and focused instead on domestic effects. In United
States v. Sisal Sales Corp.,35 the Supreme Court, relying on the effects
felt in the United States, applied the Sherman Act to a conspiracy
by U.S. persons, formed in this country but carried out abroad, to
36monopolize imports of sisal. The Second Circuit similarly applied
the Sherman Act in its United States v. Aluminum Co. of America
("Alcoa") 7 decision. In Alcoa, Judge Hand stated that "it is settled
law.., that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not
within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has
consequences within its borders which the state reprehends; and
29. Id.
30. See Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197 (1993).
31. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 585-89 (Stevens, J., concurring).
32. 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
33. Id. at 285.
34. Id. at 285-86.
35. 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
36. Id. at 274-76.
37. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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these liabilities other states will ordinarily recognize." 38
In addition to its 1945 Alcoa decision regarding the Sherman Act,
the Second Circuit also established two basic tests for the
extraterritorial application of the Securities Exchange Act. In
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,39 the court first established the "effects"
test, concluding that federal securities law may reach foreign
conduct that is "injurious to United States investors," based on the
need to protect the integrity of the U.S. securities markets, not the
citizens of foreign countries.4 0 The court then established the
"conduct" test in Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell,4'
where it held that the Securities Exchange Act applied to conduct
42
in the United States that directly caused losses to foreign investors.
The court dismissed the presumption as inapplicable when
significant conduct occurred in the United States. 3
Other circuits widely adopted these Second Circuit tests, and
even expanded them." For example, the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America' reconfigured the "effects"
test and promoted a three-part balancing test to determine when
the Sherman Act applied extraterritorially. 46 In Timberlane, an
American plaintiff alleged that the defendant corporation had
conspired with officials in a foreign country to monopolize the
timber industry.47 Although all of the alleged activities took place in
Honduras, involved only foreign citizens, and caused economic
impacts primarily in Honduras, the court nonetheless concluded
that the Sherman Act applied. 4' The Ninth Circuit's analysis
addressed whether the "interests of, and links to, the United States
38. Id. at 443.
39. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc).
40. Id. at 20 6-09.
41. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
42. Id. at 1336-37.
43. Id. at 1334.
44. See, e.g., Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(expanding the Second Circuit's approach to permit jurisdiction only when fraudulent
statements "originate in the United States, are made with scienter and in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities, and 'directly cause' the harm to those who claim to be
defrauded"); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977) (adopting "conduct" test but
requiring less conduct in the United States).
45. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
46. Id. at 615.
47. Id. at 601.
48. Id. at 615.
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including the magnitude of the effect on American foreign
commerce are sufficiently strong, vis-a-vis those of other nations, to
justify an assertion of extraterritorial authority.
''
9
By the 1980s, it seemed clear that the presumption was no longer
significant in American jurisprudence. An increasing number of
courts were applying federal laws extraterritorially, particularly
when American economic interests were at stake.5 In fact, the 1987
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law even noted that
Justice Holmes's "territorial" approach"5 to the presumption
articulated in American Banana was no longer the "current law of
the United States." ,
2
B. The Aramco Decision
In Aramco,5 the Supreme Court applied the presumption against
extraterritoriality for the first time in nearly 40 years, and held that
Title VII did not apply to employment discrimination by an
American company against an American citizen that occurred
abroad.54 Ali Boureslan, a naturalized citizen of the United States,
worked for Aramco and was transferred at his own request to Saudi
Arabia; however, he was fired four years after his transfer. 5' The
49. Id. at 613. To answer this question, the court proposed a three-part balancing test: 1)
Does the alleged restraint affect, or was it intended to affect, the foreign commerce of the
United States?; 2) Is it of such a type and magnitude as to be cognizable as a violation of the
statute at issue?; and 3) As a matter of international comity and fairness, should the
extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States be asserted to cover it? Id. at 615. If a court
found that these conditions were satisfied, the statute could be applied extraterritorially. Id.
at 614. In evaluating whether to apply U.S. laws extraterritorially, the Ninth Circuit weighed
a number of factors: a) the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy; b) the nationality or
allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal places of business of corporations; c)
the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance; d)
the relative significance of effects in the United States as compared with effects elsewhere; e)
the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce; f) the
foreseeability of such effect; and g) the relative importance to the violations charged of
conduct within the United States as compared with conduct abroad. Id.
50. See, e.g., Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (applying
Sherman Act extraterritorially); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd
on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (applying Securities Exchange Act
extraterritorially); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952) (applying Lanham Act
extraterritorially).
51. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
52. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 415, Reporters' Note 2 (1987).
53. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
54. Id. at 248.
55. Id. at 247.
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plaintiff sued his employer under Title VII, claiming that his
discharge was due to his race, religion, and ethnicity. Justice
Rehnquist framed the issue as ascertaining whether Congress
intended Title VII to apply abroad. 56 Finding no clear congressional
intent, the Supreme Court invoked the presumption and declined
to apply the statute extraterritorially.5
7
Justice Rehnquist stated that only a "clear statement" in the
language of the statute itself would be sufficient to overcome the
presumption.58 Boureslan and the E.E.O.C. first argued that Title
VII's broad definition of "commerce" to include commerce
"between a State and any place outside thereof" showed an intent
to apply the statute to areas outside the United States.59 Rehnquist
dismissed this contention as "boilerplate language, 60 and stated
"[i]f we were to permit possible, or even plausible, interpretations
of language such as that involved here to override the presumption
against extraterritorial application, there would be little left of the
presumption." 6' Justice Rehnquist concluded that if Title VII
applied to the employment of U.S. citizens abroad, it would have to
apply equally to U.S. citizens employed by foreign employers,
"which would raise difficult issues of international law., 62
Rehnquist cited two reasons for invoking the presumption. First,
it reminds the judiciary that when Congress legislates, it is
"primarily concerned with domestic conditions., 63 Second, it
protects against unintended clashes between U.S. laws and those of
other nations, which could result in international discord.64
Rehnquist carved out an exception for one statute-the Lanham
Act-which the Supreme Court had held to apply extraterritorially
nearly 40 years earlier in Steele v. Bulova.65 The Chief Justice
distinguished Steele on two grounds. First, he noted that the Act's
commerce language was broader than Title VI's language in that
the Lanham Act refers to "all commerce which may lawfully be
56. Id. at 248.
57. Id. at 248-49.
58. Id. at 258.
59. Id. at 248-49.
60. Id. at 251.
61. Id. at 253.
62. Id. at 255.
63. Id. at 248 (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
64. Id.
65. 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
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regulated by Congress., 66 Second, Rehnquist observed that "the
allegedly unlawful conduct [in Steele] had some effects within the
United States.,
67
C. Inconsistent Trends in Applying the Presumption After Aramco
In the years following the landmark decision in Aramco, the
Supreme Court and lower federal courts struggled to define the
presumption and the circumstances under which it should apply.
The Supreme Court itself has been inconsistent in its
interpretation of what is required to rebut the presumption. In
Aramco, the Court required a "clear statement" of congressional
intent to apply a U.S. statute abroad," but it has subsequently
articulated a less strict requirement of "clear evidence" of
congressional intent.69 Moreover, the Supreme Court has failed to
apply the presumption uniformly to all statutes. For example, the
Court applied the presumption in a case where the language of the
statute appears to be international in nature, 70 but refrained from
applying the presumption in another case in which there might
have been conflicts between U.S. and foreign laws.7'
Like the Supreme Court, lower federal courts also have not
applied the presumption uniformly to all federal statutes, and a
circuit split has developed. Some circuits apply the "effects" test,
others apply the "conduct" test, while others apply a combination
of the tWo.
7 2
66. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 252 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127).
67. Id. at 252.
68. Id. at 258.
69. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 (1993). Similarly, in Sale v. Haitian
Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 177 (1993), the Court did not treat the presumption as a
clear statement rule, but instead considered "all available evidence" including the Act's text,
structure, and legislative history.
70. See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 159 (1993) (holding § 243(h)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which states that the Attorney General "shall not
deport or return any alien" to a country where she would be subject to persecution, did not
apply to Haitians apprehended by the Coast Guard on the high seas).
71. See Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 819 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (noting that there was a conflict of law because "Great Britain has established a
comprehensive regulatory scheme governing the London reinsurance markets").
72. The Second Circuit in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 207-08 (2d Cir. 1968)
first discussed the "effects" test. The Second, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits have adopted a more
restrictive approach to the "conduct" test that requires the domestic conduct to have been of
"material importance" to or have "directly caused" injury in the United States. See Psimenos
v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir. 1983); Robinson v. TCI/US W.
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1. Supreme Court Decisions
In the years following Aramco, the Supreme Court has applied the
presumption to several statutes in addition to Title VII. However,
the Supreme Court has also dodged difficult questions of
extraterritorial application in good test cases. For example, one
year after Aramco, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,73 the Supreme
Court was faced with the issue of whether the Eighth Circuit
correctly applied the Endangered Species Act (ESA) to endangered
species located beyond U.S. borders. The majority declined to
reach this issue though, because it concluded that the plaintiffs
lacked standing.74
In his concurring opinion in Lujan 1, however, Justice Stevens
applied the presumption and concluded that the ESA does not
apply to activities in foreign countries.7' In applying the
presumption, Stevens looked to congressional intent, focusing not
on where the conduct being regulated occurred, but on where the
effects of that conduct would be felt.76 Because Congress is
generally concerned with domestic conditions, Stevens reasoned
that the presumption applied, as it did in Aramco, despite the fact
that the regulated conduct-federal agency decision making-
occurred in the United States.77
In the following year, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
Court in Smith v. United States,78 held that tort claims arising in
Antarctica could not be brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA) . 9 Rehnquist looked to the language, structure, and
legislative history of the Act as sources of congressional intent.80
Only after exhausting these sources of congressional intent did
Rehnquist turn to the presumption against extraterritoriality to
Communications Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 905-06 (5th Cir. 1997); Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson &
Co., 824 F.2d 27, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits apply a less
restrictive standard that only requires that the domestic conduct be significant to, rather
than the direct cause of, the injury in the United States. See SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114
(3d Cir. 1977); Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 524 (8th Cir. 1973); Butte
Mining PLC v. Smith, 76 F.3d 287, 290-91 (9th Cir. 1996).
73. 504 U.S. 555 (1992) [hereinafter Lujan II].
74. Id. at 578.
75. Id. at 585-89 (Stevens,J, concurring).
76. Id. at 588 (StevensJ, concurring).
77. Id. at 585-86 (Stevens,J, concurring).
78. 507 U.S. 197 (1993).
79. Id. at 203-04.
80. Id.
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resolve "any lingering doubt regarding the reach of the FTCA."8
Rehnquist did not characterize the presumption as requiring a
clear statement, but rather as requiring "'clear evidence' of
congressional intent to apply the FTCA to claims arising in
Antarctica. 82 The plaintiff in Smith argued that the presumption
should not apply because there was no risk of conflict with foreign
law. s3 Rehnquist responded by emphasizing that the primary reason
for the presumption is to recognize that Congress is primarily
concerned with domestic conditions when it legislates.
84
The Supreme Court's relatively clear interpretations of the
presumption became much less clear in two subsequent cases. The
first of these cases was Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.s5 In Sale,
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, concluded that § 243(h) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act, which provides that the
Attorney General "shall not deport or return any alien" to a
country where she would be subject to persecution," did not apply
87to Haitians apprehended by the Coast Guard on the high seas.
Like Smith, the Court looked to "all available evidence" on the
meaning of § 243(h), including its text, structure, and legislative
history,88  to find "the affirmative evidence of intended
extraterritorial application that our cases require."8 9 The Court
justified the application of the presumption on separation of
powers grounds, stating that the "presumption has special force
when we are construing... statutory provisions that may involve
foreign and military affairs for which the President has unique
responsibility. '" 9
The second case to undermine the Supreme Court's
presumption doctrine was Hartford Fire Insurance Company v.
California." The Court held that the Sherman Act applied to
London-based insurers and re-insurers who attempted to make
specific types of environmental insurance coverage available within
81. Id. at 203.
82. Id. at 204.
83. Id. at 204 n.5.
84. Id.
85. 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
86. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1998).
87. 509 U.S. 155, 159.
88. Id. at 177.
89. Id. at 176.
90. Id. at 188.
91. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
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the United States.9 The opinion did not mention Aramco or the
presumption. Instead, the majority relied on lower court
precedent, stating that "it is well established by now that the
Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce
and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United
States."9 3 Hartford Fire seems to ignore the concerns over conflict
with British laws, which expressly authorized the London insurers'
actions. In his dissent, Justice Scalia noted that "there is clearly a
conflict in this litigation.
94
2. Division in the Lower Federal Courts
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Aramco, lower federal
courts began to carve out exceptions to the Aramco holding, which
created a circuit split. In Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey,99 the
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit identified three
exceptions to the Aramco doctrine when it interpreted the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) . First, according to the Massey
court, the presumption against extraterritoriality will not apply
where there is an "affirmative intention of the Congress clearly
expressed" to extend the scope of the statute to conduct occurring
within other sovereign nations. 97  Second, the presumption
generally is not applied where the failure to apply the statute to a
foreign setting will result in adverse effects within the United
States.98 Finally, the presumption is not applicable when the
conduct regulated by the government occurs within the United
States.
The Ninth Circuit subsequently rejected the suggestion in Massey
"that the presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S.
laws may be 'overcome' when denying such application would
92. Id. at 769-70.
93. Id. at 796.
94. Id. at 820 (ScaliaJ., dissenting). One commentator addressed the possible reason why
the Hartford Court did not apply the presumption. In Aramco, Smith and Sale, the
extraterritorial conduct at issue had not caused harmful effects within the United States. In
Hartford, however, the conduct had caused harmful effects in the United States. See William
S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 85,
100 (1998).
95. 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
96. Id. at 531.
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,result in adverse effects within the United States."'' 00 In Subafilms
Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., the Ninth Circuit held that
the presumption precluded application of acts of Congress to
conduct that occurs abroad, even if there are harmful effects in the
United States.'0 ' The issue in Subafilms was whether authorization
within the United States of foreign reproduction of a film violated
the Copyright Act.10 2 The court concluded that there was "no clear
expression of congressional intent in either the 1976 Act or other
relevant enactments to alter the preexisting extraterritoriality
doctrine.'0 3
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the possibility of conflict with
foreign law 'justifies application of the Aramco presumption even
assuming arguendo that 'adverse effects' within the United States
'generally' would require a plenary inquiry into congressional
intent.''0 4 The court found a risk of such conflict because the
United States was a party to the Universal Copyright Convention
(UCC) and the Berne Convention, both of which require "national
treatment" and thereby "implicate[] a rule of territoriality.',0 5 The
court concluded that it would be inappropriate for the courts to act
in a manner that might disrupt Congress's efforts to secure a more
stable international intellectual property regime unless Congress
otherwise clearly expressed such intent.
6
The circuits also have disagreed about the appropriate
application of the presumption in the context of antitrust and
securities law. In the antitrust context, courts in the Ninth Circuit
have invoked the presumption against extraterritoriality to prevent
conflicts of laws.'0 7 The First Circuit relied on the "effects" test and
invoked the presumption when compliance with both U.S. and
foreign law was impossible.' In the Second Circuit, there must be a
true conflict between U.S. law and that of a foreign sovereign
before the presumption is invoked.'0 9 Because of these circuit splits,
100. Subafilms Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir.
1994) (quoting Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
101. Id. at 1097.
102. Id. at 1089.
103. Id. at 1096.
104. Id. at 1097.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Metropolitan Indus. v. Sammi Corp., 82 F.3d 839, 847 n.5 (9th Cir. 1996).
108. See United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1997).
109. See Filetech S.A.R.L. v. France Telecom, 978 F. Supp. 464, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1997),
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even after the Hartford Fire decision, the outcome of an antitrust
lawsuit may depend upon the circuit in which the claim is brought.
Like the trademark and antitrust laws, the Securities Exchange
Act"0 is one of the statutes where the presumption has traditionally
been ignored, and circuits have adopted different approaches in
addressing its extraterritorial application. For example, the Second
Circuit in Itoba Limited v. Lep Group PLC " combined the "conduct"
and "effects" tests that it had established decades earlier."2 The
court reasoned that this hybrid test would give a better indication
of U.S. involvement to justify applying U.S. law." 3 Conversely, the
Fifth Circuit in Robinson v. TCI/US West Communications, Inc."4 stated
that applying the Securities Exchange Act "within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States" included applying the Act to
conduct that has effects here, but did not include applying the Act
to conduct that occurs here but has effects elsewhere."5 The court
reasoned that to assert its jurisdiction beyond the minimum
necessary to protect domestic investors seemed unwarranted in the
absence of an express legislative command.'
6
Since Aramco, the Supreme Court has addressed the presumption
against extraterritoriality extensively, but has failed to include a
clear definition of what the presumption is and when it applies.
Because of this lack of uniformity and clarity, lower federal courts
have continued to embrace different approaches to how the
presumption should apply.
II. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
STATUTES
Courts have been much more willing to find the intent required
to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality in cases
involving economic regulation-such as securities or antitrust
vacated, 157 F.3d 922 (2d Cir. 1998).
110. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a etseq.
111. 54F.3d 118 (2dCir. 1995).
112. Id. at 121-22.
113. Id. at 122.
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law-than in non-market areas, like environmental law."' The
extraterritorial application of environmental statutes poses
challenges and provides opportunities that are different from those
involved in the economic contexts at issue in most of the cases
discussed in Part I. Part II of this Article addresses the inconsistent
approaches that federal courts have applied in analyzing the
extraterritorial application of environmental statutes, and how the
continuum of context recognized in Massey is reflected, but not
fully realized, in decisions addressing the extraterritoriality of U.S.
environmental statutes.
A. Recognition of the Continuum of Context in Massey
In Massey, the D.C. Circuit stated that there were "three general
categories of cases for which the presumption against the
extraterritorial application of statutes clearly does not apply."". The
court recognized that outside of the exclusive jurisdiction of
sovereign foreign nations and outside of the United States, there
are territories where the presumption applies with little or no
force. Generally termed "global commons," these sovereignless
areas include the EEZ, the high seas, and Antarctica." 9 The court
noted that where "the U.S. has some real measure of legislative
control.., the presumption against extraterritoriality is much
weaker.'
20
In Massey, the presumption became "much weaker" because the
U.S. controlled all air transportation, conducted all search and
rescue operations, and maintained exclusive control over research
installations under the U.S. Antarctica Program."' Combined with
Antarctica's status as a global commons area, these facts led the
court to conclude that "the presumption against extraterritoriality
is particularly inappropriate . . . in this case." The court then
117. See Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome": Multinational Misconduct and the Presumption
Against Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 598, 599-600 (1990).
118. Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
119. Natural Resources Defense Council v. United States Department of Navy, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 26360*37-38 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2002). For helpful additional context on the
EEZ and its role in the analysis in Navy, see Deirdre Goldfarb, Comment, NEPA: Application in
the Territorial Seas, the Exclusive Economic Zone, the Global Commons, and Beyond, 32 Sw. U. L. REV.
735, 749-55 (2003).
120. Massey, 986 F.2d at 533.
121. Id. at 534.
122. Id.
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acknowledged that in the high seas, application of NEPA also
would "avoid ill-will and conflict between nations arising out of one
nation's encroachments upon another's sovereignty.'0
23
However, the court acknowledged that there have been situations
when the "government may avoid the EIS requirement where U.S.
foreign policy interests outweigh the benefits derived from
preparing an EIS."' 4 In those examples the court cited, alleged
harm to national security and foreign policy interests arose from
attempts to apply NEPA to foreign sovereign territories.2 6 The
Massey court noted at the end of its opinion that "we do not decide
today how NEPA might apply to actions in a case involving an
actual foreign sovereign."'
' 27
B. Massey's Continuum of Context Applied to the Extraterritorial
Application of Environmental Statutes
What emerges from the D.C. Circuit's analysis in Massey is a
continuum of territories where the extraterritorial applicability of a
U.S. environmental statute corresponds directly to the amount of
legislative control the U.S. has over that territory."" At one end of
the continuum is the United States, and at the other end are
sovereign foreign territories, where a statute must demonstrate
clear congressional intent to apply.
Between the two ends of the continuum are sovereignless "global
commons" areas over which the U.S. has some measure of
legislative control. In global commons, the presumption applies
with little or no force absent any other foreign policy concerns that
a court may find. This middle ground area of the continuum
recognized in Massey is where procedural environmental statutes,
like NEPA's EIS requirement and the consultation requirement in
§ 7 of the ESA, always should apply outside U.S. territorial
123. Id.
124. Id. at 535.
125. Id. (discussing, among other cases, Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981) and Committee for Nuclear
Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 537. The possible extraterritorial application of NEPA to foreign sovereign
territories is the test case scenario that Friends of the Earth v. Watson, No. C 02-4106, 2005
WL 2035596 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005), presents. For a full discussion of the Watson case, see
infra Part III. B.
128. Massey, 986 F.2d at 533.
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boundaries. These procedural mechanisms regulate only U.S.
agency decisions on U.S. soil and thus present no threat of
international discord.
1. Foreign Sovereign Territories
Congress must express clear intent for a U.S. statute to apply to
foreign sovereign land and waters. In a trio of cases interpreting
the application of three environmental statutes, RCRA, CERCLA,
and the MMPA, courts have held that a foreign sovereign has
exclusive rights to resources located in its territory. 29 Unlike NEPA,
none of these three statutes regulates federal agency actions within
the United States. Because these courts did not find a clear
expression of such congressional intent after an analysis of each
statute's language, structure, and legislative history, the
extraterritorial reach of these three statutes was restricted.
1 3 °
In Amlon Metals13' and ARC Ecology,32 the plaintiffs sought to have
RCRA and CERCIA, respectively, apply to territories of foreign
sovereigns. Because of each statute's ambiguous legislative intent,
the extraterritorial application of CERCLA and RCRA was
restricted under the presumption. The Amlon Metals and ARC
Ecology courts strictly interpreted the language, structure, and
legislative history of RCRA and CERCLA to avoid potential foreign
policy problems. 133 Although the scope of the MMPA is broader
because it applies to the high seas, the MMPA similarly was held
not to apply to the waters of a foreign sovereign in Mitchell.13 4 The
court was explicit that since the MMPA is a conservation statute, it
would not extend the statute and invade the sovereignty of other
nations. 1
5
129. See Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (analyzing
RCRA); ARC Ecology v. United States Department of the Air Force, 411 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir.
2005) (analyzing CERCLA); United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996, 1003 (5th Cir. 1977)
(analyzing MMPA).
130. Id.
131. 775 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
132. 411 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2005).
133. See generally Amlon Metals, 775 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (analyzing RCRA); ARC
Ecology, 411 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2005) (analyzing CERCLA).
134. United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996, 1003 (5th Cir. 1977).
135. Id.
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a. RCRA-Amlon Metals (Foreign Sovereign Lands)
Enacted in 1976, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) s6 regulates the generation, transportation, treatment,
storage, and disposal of hazardous wastes. 3 7 Amlon Metals is the only
case that addresses whether RCRA applies to waste located outside
the United States. 38 The court in Amlon Metals held that RCRA did
not apply extraterritorially to give a United Kingdom corporation
and its American agent a cause of action against FMC, a Delaware
corporation.3 9 The plaintiff and its agent, Amlon Metals, filed suit
in U.S. district court alleging that FMC misrepresented the
composition and characteristics of copper residue in barrels
shipped to England.'40 Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and
damages under RCRA's citizen suit provision.
4
1
The plaintiffs in Amlon Metals sought to avoid the effect of the
presumption against extraterritoriality by citing the "conduct" test
articulated in Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell.'
42
The conduct test provides that when "there has been significant
conduct within the territory, a statute cannot properly be held
inapplicable simply on the ground that, absent the clearest
language, Congress will not be assumed to have meant to go
beyond the limits recognized by foreign relations law."' 43 The
plaintiffs in Amlon Metals asserted that the conduct test applied
because "significant activities giving rise to the endangerment,
including the generation of the waste, the making of the contract
and the consignment of the waste to the carrier, took place in the
U.S."' 44 The court disagreed, stating that in Leasco, the court did not
apply the conduct test until it found sufficient overseas application
of the statute.145
136. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000).
137. See Joshua E. Latham, The Military Munitions Rule and Environmental Regulation of
Munitions, 27 B.C. ENVIrt. AFF. L. REv. 467, 476-77 (2000) (discussing RCRA's requirements
for the treatment and handling of waste).
138. SeeAmlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). See generally
Maria A. Mazzocchi, Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp.: U.S. Courts' Denial of International
Environmental Responsibility, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 155 (1997).
139. Amlon Metals, 775 F. Supp. at 668.
140. Id. at 668-71.
141. 42 U.S.C. § 6972.
142. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
143. Id. at 1334.
144. Amlon Metals, 775 F. Supp. at 673.
145. Id.
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Plaintiffs conceded that the initial focus of Congress when
passing RCRA was "entirely domestic";146 however, they cited two
pieces of evidence from the Hazardous and Solid Waste
Amendments of 1984 (HWSA) to show that Congress intended
RCRA to apply extraterritorially. The first piece was Representative
Mikulski's remarks that "our own country will have safeguards from
the ill effects of hazardous waste upon passage of [HWSA]. We
should take an equally firm stand on the transportation of
hazardous waste bound for export to other countries."'147 The
second piece of evidence was Senator Mitchell's remarks, which
also were made in reference to RCRA's waste export provision.
148
The court determined that Mikulski's and Mitchell's remarks
referred to RCRA's hazardous waste export provision, not the
citizen suit provision.'49
Plaintiffs then relied on the statute's export provision and the use
of the term "any person" in its citizen suit provision." ° Plaintiffs
argued that RCRA's citizen suit provision should be applied
extraterritorially because RCRA's citizen suit provision and export
provision were passed as a single bill.15' The court concluded that
even if the two provisions were passed at the same time, they "were
certainly discussed separately, with a domestic emphasis attached to
the remedial provision.'
52
In considering the term "any person," the court stated that
"without more [it] cannot be said to establish RCRA's
extraterritorial applicability.', 53 When read in conjunction with
other portions of the citizen suit provision reflecting a domestic
focus, such as a lack of venue for waste located in a foreign country
and numerous references to "State," the court stated that the term
"any person" reveals a domestic focus. 54
Finally, the court noted that RCRA "contains a number of
provisions designed to limit the statute's encroachment on state
sovereignty, but contains no parallel provisions protecting the
146. Id. at 674.
147. Id. (quoting 129 CONG. REC. 27,691 (1984)).
148. Id. See also 130 CONG. REC. 20,816 (1984).
149. Amlon Metals, 775 F. Supp. at 673.
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sovereignty of other nations... Just as the EPA Administrator must
provide notice to "the affected State" before commencing an action
to redress "an imminent and substantial endangerment to health
and environment," the court noted that "there is no analogous
provision requiring notice to the appropriate authorities in a
foreign country." 56
b. CERCLA-ARC Ecology (Foreign Sovereign Lands)
Enacted in 1980 in response to the "serious environmental and
health risks posed by industrial pollution," CERCLA was designed
to give EPA the authority to deal effectively with spills of hazardous
substances as well as with the consequences of improper, negligent,
and reckless hazardous waste disposal practices.157 CERCLA imposes
strict liability on all potentially responsible parties for the cleanup
of hazardous wastes. 58 The statute's primary objectives are "'to
ensure the prompt and effective cleanup of waste disposal sites, and
to assure that parties responsible for hazardous substances [bear]
the cost of remedying the conditions they created."
5 9
CERCLA's citizen suit provision was modeled, in part, on RCRA's
citizen suit provision. Due to the similarity between the citizen
suit provisions in these statutes, courts have interpreted CERCLA
and RCRA as having a similar geographical scope, as illustrated in
the Ninth Circuit case, ARC Ecology v. United States Department of the
Air Force. 161
In ARC Ecology, Philippine residents and environmental
organizations sought to compel the U.S. military to conduct a
preliminary assessment of environmental pollution on two former
U.S. military bases in the Philippines. 62 The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision that appellants failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted because CERCLA did not apply
155. Id. at 676.
156. Id.
157. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 55 (1998).
158. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2000).
159. Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1300 (9th Cir. 1997)
(quoting Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 809 F.2d 1454, 1455 (9th Cir. 1986)).
160. See S. REP. No. 99-11, at 62 (1985), reprinted in 2 Legislative History at 654 (Comm.
Print 1990).
161. 411 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2005).
162. Id. at 1095-96.
[Vol. 31:1
Extraterritorial Application: A Proposal
extraterritorially. 163 The court stated that it found "no evidence that
Congress expressly (or implicitly) intended to authorize suits under
CERCLA by foreign claimants allegedly affected by contamination
occurring on a U.S. military base located in a foreign country."
164
The court reviewed the district court's interpretation of
CERCLA's geographic scope. The court determined that CERCLA
§ 105(d) 165 was silent as to its scope and with respect to who may
petition for a preliminary assessment. 166 However, appellants
argued that Congress intended to apply the statute to former U.S.
military bases located outside of the United States. In support of
their argument, appellants cited CERCLA's definition of "United
States," which includes "any other territory or possession over
which the United States has jurisdiction. 1 6 ' The court stated that
such language would apply to operational U.S. military bases
located in foreign countries, but the base in the present case had
not been under U.S. control for 10 years by the time suit was filed.
Consequently, "without an intergovernmental agreement between
the United States and the Philippine government," the U.S. no
longer had authority to address any contamination issues at the
former base.' 68 Noting that the case at bar concerned an
extraterritorial application of a U.S. statute, the court then read the
statute according to the presumption against extraterritoriality.' 69
The court nevertheless proceeded to review the substance of
CERCLA, beginning with § 111 (1),170 which "expressly authorizes
some actions by a narrow class of foreign claimants.' 7' However,
because the military base in question did not release hazardous
substances into the navigable waters, territorial sea, or adjacent
shoreline of a foreign country as the provision requires, the court
found this section inapplicable. 7 2 In addition, as the appellants
"[did] not allege that their suit [was] authorized by a 'treaty or an
executive agreement' between" the U.S. and the Philippines, the
163. Id. at 1103.
164. Id. at 1098.
165. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(d) (2000).
166. ARC Ecology, 411 F.3d at 1096.
167. Id. at 1097.
168. Id. at 1098.
169. Id. at 1097.
170. 42 U.S.C. § 9611(1).
171. ARC Ecology, 411 F.3d at 1099.
172. Id.
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court concluded that appellants did not qualify as "foreign
claimants" under CERCLA.
173
The court then consulted other provisions of CERCLA and
determined that "the statute's general approach, concerns, and
procedures are inimical to judicial challenges to contamination
alleged from sites outside of the territorial boundaries of the
United States."174 For example, CERCLA requires that before
determining appropriate remedial action, the President must
consult with the affected State or States, "unless the State in which
the release occurs first enters into a contract" with the United
States. 175 However, "[t]he statute does not contemplate like
arrangements with foreign countries. '176 In addition, the court
noted that "there is no provision in CERCLA that provides
authority to place any foreign site on the National Priorities List,
and, consequently, no foreign site appears on that list."
177
Furthermore, the court concluded that there is nothing in
CERCLA's legislative history that suggests CERCLA applies to
wastes located in a foreign country.7 Rather, the legislative history
indicates that Congress intended a domestic focus. 79 For example,
a House committee report noted, just prior to CERCLA's re-
authorization, that "there may be as many as 10,000 [] sites across
the Nation," and that "the federal government's allocation of
resources was inadequate to 'fulfill promises that were made to
clean up abandoned hazardous wastes in this country.'""80 Thus, the
court reasoned, "[b]ecause the congressional record is silent as to
any extraterritorial application of CERCLA, it is unlikely that
Congress intended for CERCLA to provide relief to the
appellants."''
173. Id. at 1097-99.
174. Id. at 1100.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1101.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 1, at 55, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835,
2837 (emphasis added)).
181. Id. at 1101.
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c. MMPA-Mitchell (Foreign Sovereign Waters)
Enacted in 1972, the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA)
82
is designed to prevent "such species and population stocks...
[from] diminish [ing] beyond the point at which they cease to be a
significant functioning element in the ecosystem of which they are
a part .".. To fulfill this goal, MMPA § 1371 establishes a
"permanent moratorium," which is a "complete cessation of the
taking of marine mammals and a complete ban on the importation
into the United States. 1 4 During a moratorium, the Secretary of
Commerce may issue permits for the taking of mammals for various
185
purposes.
Although the Act identifies a clear geographic scope regarding
specific prohibitions,18 6 the extraterritorial reach of the moratorium
was unclear before United States v. Mitchell was decided in 1977. In
Mitchell, an American citizen appealed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit after being convicted of violations
of the MMPA for the illegal taking of dolphins in Bahamian
territorial waters. 8 7 The defendant admitted taking dolphins while
employed by the owner of a Bahamian-based aquarium who
intended to export the dolphins to Great Britain.' 8 The owner
obtained Mitchell's permit from the Bahamian government. 89 On
appeal, and considering only the extraterritorial scope of the
statute, the court held that the MMPA did not apply to the takings
of dolphins by an American citizen in foreign waters.' 90
In reaching the decision that the MMPA did not extend beyond
the high seas and into foreign sovereign waters, the court
considered two principles of statutory construction. 9' Under the
first principle, a court must consider the nature of the statute.' A
law will be applied abroad if limiting its reach to the strictly
182. Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421h.
183. 16 U.S.C. § 1361(2).
184. Id. § 1362(8).
185. See Mitchel4 553 F.2d at 1000 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 1373(a), 1374(b), 1371(a) (3) (A)).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 997-1000.
188. Id. at 997.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1004-05.
191. The definition of "high seas" in the MMPA "excludes the territorial waters of
sovereign states." Id. at 1005 n.15.
192. Id. at 1002.
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territorial jurisdiction would gready curtail the scope, usefulness, or
'93purpose of the statute. Under the first principle, the court
recognized that because the MMPA is a conservation statute, the
nature of such a bill "is based on the control that a sovereign such




Because other sovereigns enjoy the same authority over the
resources located within their own territories, the court stated that
it is important for such problems to be resolved through
negotiation and agreement. 19 The court noted that, due to the
conservation purpose of the statute, restricting the territorial scope
of the MMPA would not curtail the scope, usefulness, or purpose of
the statute.196
The second principle provides "if the nature of the law does not
mandate its extraterritorial application, then a presumption arises
against such application. '"' 97 Applying the second principle, the
court concluded that the presumption applied.' 9 Accordingly, the
court looked for "a clear expression of congressional intent for
application of the Act in foreign territories," considering the
structure, language, and legislative history of the MMPA.' 9 Sections
1371 and 1362(8), which respectively announce and define the
moratorium, do not address the geographic scope of the ban on
takings and importation, but rather use all-inclusive language.00
The court concluded that the MMPA's all-inclusive language, which
does not expressly address territoriality, does not indicate clear
intent for extraterritorial application.20 '
Moreover, when Congress did define the geographic scope of
prohibitions in § 1372, takings without permits were prohibited
only in U.S. territory and on the high seas. 2 Such an omission, "of
the territory of other sovereigns," the court concluded, "permits
the reasonable inference that Congress concluded the prohibitions
should not extend extraterritorially. ' '20 3 Furthermore, the permit
193. Id. (citing U.S. v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922)).
194. Id. at 1002.
195. Id. at 1002-03.
196. Id. at 1003.
197. Id. at 1002.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1003.
200. Id. at 1003-04.
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system in §§ 1373 and 1374 did not contemplate extraterritorial
jurisdiction beyond the high seas into foreign sovereign waters. °4
The legislative history also revealed a domestic focus. The court
cited the annual hunt of baby harp seals off the Canadian coast in
which "the committee noted the 'great public concern and
indignation' over the hunt.,20 ' Although it could have prohibited
American participation in the hunt, the committee only proposed a
ban on importation of the skins.20 6 Furthermore, debate over the
addition of the moratorium to the House bill on the floor of
Congress did not include any discussion of territoriality.0 7
Consequently, the court held that the MMPA did not extend to the
208waters controlled exclusively by another foreign sovereign.
2. Contexts in Which the U.S. Has Some Control
Generally referred to as "global commons" areas, the high seas,
Antarctica, and the EEZ of the U.S. are sovereignless areas where
application of U.S. law does not conflict with the purpose
underlying the presumption as articulated in Aramco.2° Courts have
held that the presumption does not apply when the U.S. maintains
a certain amount of legislative control over a global commons
area.2 0 For example, Massey held that the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA)2 1 ' applies extraterritorially to Antarctica and the
EEZ, 212 and Lujan I held that the Endangered Species Act (ESA)
2 13
applies to the high seas and possibly to the territory of a foreign
sovereign.14 The cases that have addressed the extraterritorial
application of NEPA and ESA have permitted extraterritorial
application based on the nature of the statute as well as the nature
of the place that would feel its effect. This section of the Article will
first examine NEPA's application to the global commons and then
will address ESA's application to the global commons and foreign




208. Id. at 1005.
209. Massey, 986 F.2d at 534.
210. Id.
211. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4335.
212. See Massey, 986 F.2d at 529, 533-34.
213. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
214. SeeDefenders ofXWildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117, 125 (80 Cir. 1990).
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nations.
a. NEPA (Antarctica and the EEZ)
NEPA was enacted in 1969 to "encourage productive and
enjoyable harmony between man and his environment. 2 1 5 NEPA
requires that all agencies of the federal government prepare an
environmental impact statement (EIS) before commencing "major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment. 2 16 An EIS is a detailed statement that must include
the environmental impact of the proposed action, unavoidable
adverse environmental impacts, and alternatives to the proposed
action.217 The extraterritorial reach of NEPA was first addressed in
Massey and then again in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Navy. 218
Massey and Navy do not, however, fully resolve to what degree, if at
all, a court should consider foreign policy concerns in the
extraterritorial application of NEPA.
i. Antarctica (Massey)
In Massey, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) appealed a
district court's order dismissing its action seeking to enjoin the
National Science Foundation (NSF) from permitting the
incineration of wastes produced by one of its research facilities in
Antarctica.2 ' 9 EDF contended that the planned incineration would
produce "highly toxic pollutants which could be hazardous to the
environment," and that "NSF failed to consider fully the
consequences of its decision to resume incineration as required by
the decisionmaking process established by NEPA., 2 0 The district
court declined to apply NEPA extraterritorially because the
language "did not contain a clear expression of legislative intent
through a plain statement of extraterritorial statutory effect.
2 2'
However, the D.C. Circuit was unconvinced by the district court's
method of analysis and concluded that the district court "bypassed
215. 42 U.S.C. § 4321.
216. Id. § 4332(2) (C).
217. Id.
218. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26360 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2002).
219. Massey, 986 F.2d at 529.
220. Id. at 530.
221. Id. at 529.
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the threshold question of whether the application of NEPA to
agency actions in Antarctica presents an extraterritoriality problem
at all. '2 22 In its reversal, the D.C. Circuit considered 1) the nature of
NEPA, 2) the territory that would feel its extraterritorial effect, and
3) additional foreign policy concerns.
The court first noted that the district court overlooked the fact
that there are exceptions to the presumption.222 In examining
NEPA, the court concluded that because NEPA regulates federal
agency decisions within the United States, and not the substance of
agency decisions, the presumption against extraterritoriality did
not apply. 224 The court stated, "NEPA would never require
enforcement in a foreign forum or involve 'choice of law'
dilemmas. ''2 5
The court then considered the territory that would feel NEPA's
effect. Due to the unique status of Antarctica as a sovereignless
territory, the court concluded that the presumption was not
implicated.226 The court then concluded that the presumption
becomes "much weaker" because the United States controls all air
transportation, conducts all search and rescue operations, and
maintains exclusive control over research installations under the
227U.S. Antarctica Program. These factors, combined with
Antarctica's status in the international community, led the court to
conclude that "the presumption against extraterritoriality is
particularly inappropriate ... in this case., 228 Hence, applying NEPA
to Antarctica "would not conflict with the primary purpose
underlying the venerable rule of interpretation-to avoid ill-will
and conflict between nations arising out of one nation's
encroachments upon another's sovereignty.
'2 29
However, the court still considered other foreign policy concerns
in addressing two of NSF's arguments that the presumption does
control. It was not persuaded that the EIS requirement would
interfere with U.S. efforts to work cooperatively with other nations
or conflict with the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the
222. Id. at 532.
223. Id. at 531-32.
224. Id. at 533.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 533-534.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 534.
229. Id.
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Antarctic Treaty.23 0 The treaty was "years away from ratification,"
and the court found it "unable to comprehend the difficulty
presented by the two standards of review" if an EIS statement were
required of the defendants. 31
ii. The EEZ (NRDC v. Navy)
Although only in dicta, the Massey court acknowledged that there
are "global commons" areas other than Antarctica in which NEPA
also may apply.23 2 It was not until almost a decade later, in Natural
Resources Defense Council v. United States Department of Navy, 3 that
NEPA's extraterritorial scope became clearer. In this case, the EEZ
and high seas were added to the list of global commons areas
where NEPA may apply.234 Although the court borrowed extensively
from Massey, it did not, as the Massey court had done, consider
additional foreign policy concerns after examining NEPA and the
place that would feel its effect.
In Navy, environmental organizations sued the U.S. Department
of the Navy seeking to enjoin the Navy from performing sea tests of
experimental anti-submarine warfare technologies.23 ' Since the
sonar tests were capable of significantly affecting the environment
and marine wildlife, plaintiffs argued that the Navy was required to
undertake NEPA studies before performing more tests in the
future.
36
Persuaded by Massey, the United States District Court for the
Central District of California held that extraterritoriality analysis
did not apply to NEPA in this case because NEPA is designed to
regulate agency decisions in the United States. 237 In Navy, planning
for the LWAD program took place entirely in the United States and
is "therefore not subject to the presumption against
extraterritoriality., 23 8 The court acknowledged that NEPA would
230. Id. at 534-35.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 534.
233. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26360 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2002).
234. Id. at *37-38. For helpful additional context on the EEZ and its role in the analysis
in Navy, see Deirdre Goldfarb, Comment, AEPA: Application in the Territorial Seas, the Exclusive
Economic Zone, the Global Commons, and Beyond, 32 Sw. U. L. REv. 735, 749-55 (2003).
235. Id. at *2.
236. Id.
237. Id. at *32.
238. Id. at *34.
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not apply extraterritorially when "its application would...
demonstrate a lack of respect for another nation's sovereignty.,
239
However, there was no "lack of respect for another nation's
sovereignty" in Navy because "most if not all LWAD sea tests have
been conducted in the open oceans or within the United States'
EEZ, areas which, like Antarctica as characterized by Massey, are
global commons. , 240 The court in Navy considered the high seas
and the EEZ, like Antarctica, to be global commons areas because
the United States has "substantial legislative control" over the
areas. 24' The court added that "the foreign policy implications of
applying NEPA in this case are minimal" because the U.S. enjoys
the "sovereign" right of exploring, exploiting, conserving and
managing natural resources within the EEZ. 42
Although the Navy court borrowed extensively from the court's
analysis in Massey, unlike Massey it did not consider additional
policy considerations beyond its examination of the global
commons. Because the U.S. has more legislative control in the EEZ
than in Antarctica or on the high seas, it follows that there would
be less of a threat in the EEZ to "implicate important foreign policy
concerns or demonstrate a lack of respect for another nation's
sovereignty.,
243
b. ESA (Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife)
Unlike NEPA, the extraterritorial fate of the ESA has been
determined more by Congress than by the courts. Described as "the
most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered
species ever enacted by any nation,"244 the ESA 24 5 seeks to protect
endangered species. The Act requires the Secretary of the Interior
to promulgate by regulation "a list of those species which are either
endangered or threatened under enumerated criteria, and to
239. Id. at *35. See infra Part IV for a discussion of NEPA extraterritoriality and foreign
policy concerns.
240. Id. at *37-38.
241. Id. at*41.
242. Id. at *38-39. The court concluded that "with regard to natural resource
conservation and management, the area of concern to which NEPA is directed, the United
States does have substantial, if not exclusive, legislative control of the EEZ." Id. at * 41.
243. Id. at *34.
244. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978).
245. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544.
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define the critical habitat of these species., 246 In § 7, each federal
agency must consult with the Secretary to "insure that any action
authorized, funded, or carried out by such [federal] agency... is
not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered
species.
247
At one time, the Department of the Interior had promulgated a
joint regulation stating that the obligations imposed by § 7(a)(2)
extended to actions taken in foreign nations. Section 7(a)(2)
subsequently was reinterpreted to include only "actions taken in
the United States or on the high seas. 248 Shortly after the
promulgation of the regulation limiting § 7(a)(2), organizations
dedicated to wildlife conservation filed an action against the
Secretary of the Interior. In Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan,249 the
plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment claiming that the
reinterpretation of § 7(a)(2) was in error and an injunction
requiring the Secretary to promulgate a new regulation restoring
its prior interpretation. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
court's holding that Congress intended that the Act's consultation
requirement apply to projects in foreign nations.250 The court cited
the Act's language, ambitious purpose, and structure, and
concluded, "viewed as a whole, [the Act] clearly demonstrates
congressional commitment to worldwide conservation efforts. '5 '
The court first consulted the statute's language opining that it
was "all-inclusive. ' 2 In particular, "the statute clearly states that
each federal agency must consult with the Secretary regarding any
action to insure that such action is not likely to jeopardize the
existence of any endangered species., 25 3 The court stated, however,
that it would search further for a clearer expression of
246. 16 U.S.C. § 1534.
247. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). If an agency proposes to undertake any action that may
jeopardize a species listed pursuant to the ESA, the agency must complete a number of
consultation measures and, if necessary, make appropriate adjustments. See Scott A. Powell,
Comment, Global Protection of Threatened and Endangered Species: Rethinking Section 7 of the
Endangered Species Act, 31 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 523, 524-525 (1995).
248. Lujan II, 504 U.S. at 558-9 (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 402.02). The new regulation defines
.action" as "all activities or programs of any kind authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole
or in part, by Federal agencies in the United States or upon the high seas." Id.
249. 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Lujan 1].
250. Id. at 118.
251. Id. at 123.
252. Id. at 122.
253. Id. (emphasis in original).
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congressional intent.254
The Act defines "endangered species" broadly and without
geographic limitations.55 The Act sets out a detailed procedure for
determining whether a species is endangered.256 This section states
that the Secretary shall determine whether a species is endangered
or threatened after taking into account "those efforts, if any, being
made by any State or foreign nation.., to protect such species.
257
The Secretary is instructed to give consideration to species that
have been designated as requiring protection from unrestricted
commerce by any foreign nation, or pursuant to any international
agreement, and species identified as in danger of extinction by any
State agency or by any agency of a foreign nation. 258 The Act also
contains a section entitled "International [C]ooperation," which
declares that the United States' commitment to worldwide
protection of endangered species will be backed by financial
assistance, personnel assignments, investigations, and by
encouraging foreign nations to develop their own conservation
259programs. On the basis of these statutory provisions, the court
concluded that the answer to the extraterritoriality issue can be
found in the plain language of the statute.2 °
The court relied on past administrative interpretation of the Act
to reinforce its conclusion on the extraterritorial nature of the
ESA. The Secretary concluded that Congress intended the duty to
extend beyond the United States, and published a final rule on
January 4, 1978, providing that § 7 "requires every Federal agency
to insure that its activities or programs in the United States, upon
the high seas, and in foreign countries, will not jeopardize the
continued existence of a listed species.,
261
The Supreme Court reversed on other grounds, holding that the
plaintiffs lacked standing. 62 Although the majority did not address
the presumption, Justice Stevens did so in a concurring opinion.
Stevens stated, "I am not persuaded that Congress intended the
254. Id. at 122.
255. Id. at 123 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6)).
256. Id. (citing to § 1533).
257. Id. (quoting § 1533(b) (1) (A)).
258. Id. (citing to § 1533(b)(1)(B)(i), (ii)).
259. Id. § 1537.
260. Lujan 1, 911 F.2d at 123.
261. Id. at 123-24 (emphasis in original).
262. Lujan I, 504 U.S. at 578.
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consultation requirement... to apply to activities in foreign
countries., 263 He opined that the text of § 7 lacks any indication
that it applies in foreign countries because there is no geographic
reference. Stevens concluded that because other sections of the Act
"expressly deal with the problem of protecting endangered species
abroad," Congress did not intend the more obscure language of § 7
to apply to foreign countries. 264
III. THE FUTURE OF THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES: PAKOOTAS V. ECK COMINCO METALS AND
FPENDS OF THE EARTH V. WATSON
¢ 265
Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Inc. and Friends of the Earth v.
Watson 2 6 6  are the two most recent cases to address the
extraterritoriality of environmental statutes. The issue in Teck
Cominco Metals is whether CERCLA may be applied to a Canadian
corporation's operations that caused pollution that migrated into
the United States.267 The issue in Watson concerns whether NEPA
may be applied to U.S. investment agencies that fund overseas
projects, where the emissions from those projects contribute toglobl . 2611
global warming. In both cases, which are pending in 2006, the
litigants are seeking redress for harm that is felt in the United
States.
A. CERCLA Extraterritoriality: Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals
1. Factual Origins of the Dispute
Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. (TCM), a Canadian corporation,
owns and operates one of the world's largest zinc and lead refining
and smelting complexes in Trail, British Columbia, Canada.269 TCM
263. Id. at 581 (Stevens, J., concurring).
264. Id. at 588-89. For example, § 8 authorizes the President to provide assistance to any
foreign country with its consent for programs that are "necessary or useful for the
conservation of any endangered species listed by the Secretary pursuant to section 1533 of
this title." Id. at 588 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1537(a)). Also, § 9 "makes it unlawful to import
endangered species into (or export them from) the United States or to otherwise traffic in
endangered species 'in interstate or foreign commerce.'" Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1538).
265. No. 05-35153 (9th Cit. filed Feb. 24, 2005).
266. No. C 02-410JSW, 2005 WL 2035596 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005).
267. No. CV-04-256-AAM, 2004 WL 2578982, *1 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 8,2004).
268. No. C 02-410JSW, 2005 WL 2035596, *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005).
269. Pl.'s Compl. 2.3, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV-04-0256-AAM
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is located on the Columbia River, approximately 10 miles from the
United States-Canada border, north of Lake Roosevelt, in
Washington State.2v° The smelter discharged hazardous substances
into the Columbia River in Canada for several decades. 271 Those
substances allegedly flowed downstream into the United States, and
allegedly polluted the Upper Columbia River and Lake Roosevelt
in Washington State. This area, known as the Upper Columbia
River Basin ("the site"), is mostly inhabited by Native American
tribes and local farmers.272
The EPA estimated that TCM discharged approximately 12
million tons of "slag," a "black, glassy material which contains
copper, lead, and zinc" as well as other heavy metals, into the
Columbia River from 1940 through 1994.72 Many consider the site
toxic because studies have revealed elevated concentrations of trace
elements above acceptable Canadian and U.S. standards such as
arsenic, cadmium, copper, lead, mercury, and zinc in the water,
bed sediment, and fish of Lake Roosevelt, and in the upstream
274reach of the river. The Washington State Health Department
supports local residents' contention that a range of illnesses in the
area are attributable to the water pollution, including cancer,
colitis, and leukemia.2"' Members of the Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Reservation, who depend on the resources of the site, claim
that the hazardous contaminants discharged by the smelter have
impaired their "hunting, fishing, and gathering rights.
2 76
In August 1999, the Colville Tribes petitioned the EPA to
conduct a preliminary assessment to investigate the health and
environmental risks of hazardous substances believed to be at the
277site. By October 2002, the EPA had determined that the area
(E.D. Wash. filed July 21, 2004).
270. Id.
271. Pl.'s Compl. 1 4.1.
272. U.S. EPA, Upper Columbia River Expanded Site Inspection Report Northeast Washington at
2-3 (2003) [hereinafter EPA Columbia River Report], available at http://www.epa.gov/
rIOearth/offices/oec/UCR/Upper%2Columbia%2River%20ESI.pdf.
273. Id. at 2-11 to -12. The smelter discontinued routine slag discharge in 1995. Id. at 2-
13.
274. See Austen L. Parrish, Trail Smelter Do ,i Vu: Extraterritoriality, International
Environmental Law, and the Search for Solutions to Canadian-U.S. Transbounday Water Pollution
Disputes, 85 B.U. L. REv. 363, 372 (2005).
275. Id. at 373.
276. Complaint at 11 4.6 to 4.7, Pakootas, No. CV-04-256-AAM (E.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 2004).
277. Brief for Appellees at 5, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. 05-35153 (9th
Cir. July 20, 2005).
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qualified for potential listing under CERCLA, which is reserved for
the country's most polluted sites.2 78 The Canadian government
responded by sending a diplomatic note to the U.S. State
Department stating that the EPA does not have jurisdiction over
TCM under CERCLA. 79 Negotiations and discussions between the
EPA and TCM ended in late 2003, without any agreement.
28°
On December 11, 2003, the EPA issued a Unilateral
Administrative Order (UAO) demanding that TCM complete a
remedial investigation and feasibility study (RI/FS) consistent with
CERCLA.281 TCM offered to pay 13 million dollars for independent
studies , but refused to comply with the order, which authorized
the EPA to either: 1) sue to compel compliance; or 2) fund the
study itself and take remedial action, and then later sue TCM for
costs incurred.283 The EPA failed to file suit against TCM. s4
Therefore, on July 21, 2004, members of the Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Reservation, Joseph Pakootas and Donald R.
Michel (collectively "Pakootas"), filed a complaint under
CERCLA's citizen suit provision in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington seeking to enforce the EPA's
order.285 TCM filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(6),
contending that the court lacked personal and subject matter
jurisdiction, and that plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.86 The court was presented with an issue of
first impression, namely whether the EPA can compel a Canadian
company, governed by Canadian environmental law, to comply
with the terms of CERCLA.
278. Id. at 5-6.
279. See Richard A. Du Bey & Jennifer Sanscrainte, The Role Of the Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Reservation In Fighting to Protect and Clean-Up the Boundary Waters of the United States: A
Case Study of the Upper Columbia River and Lake Roosevelt Environment, 12 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L.
REV. 335, 361-62 (2004).
280. Brief for Appellees at 6, Pakootas, No. 05-35153 (9th Cir.July 20, 2005).
281. Id.; see also Complaint at 4.8, Pakootas, No. CV-04-256-AAM (E.D. Wash. Nov. 8,
2004).
282. See U.S. Has No Authority Over B.C. Smelter Operation, NAT'L POST, Jan. 14, 2004, at
FP07, 2004 WL 57228271.
283. Pl.'s Compl. 4.8-5.3.
284. Id. 4.10.
285. Pl's Compl. 1 1.1
286. Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Pakootas, No. CV-04-
256-AAM (E.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 2004).
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2. The District Court's Opinion
The district court denied TCM's motion to dismiss.9 7 The court
acknowledged that absent any congressional intent to the contrary,
federal or state legislation is presumed not to have extraterritorial
application. 288 The court determined that Congress unequivocally
expressed its intent that CERCLA remedy "domestic conditions, 28 9
but held that CERCLA can extend into Canada to deal with impacts
resulting within the United States. 290 The court reasoned that
environmental impacts to the site in the United States would not be
remedied unless EPA's order could reach TCM in Canada.29'
The court emphasized that the EPA was not trying to regulate or
direct TCM's discharge of hazardous substances at its facility in
Canada.292 It further stated that the EPA was not trying to tell the
Canadian government how to regulate the environmental aspects
of businesses in Canada.2" The court noted that although
extending CERCLA to TCM might have an incidental or indirect
impact on the way the company conducts its water discharges in
Canada, such an indirect result did not conflict with Canadian
regulatory authority.
2 94
3. Parties' Arguments on Appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals
TCM filed an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit seeking to reverse the district court's denial of its
motion to dismiss.25 TCM asserted that the court did not have
jurisdiction over TCM or its operations in Canada for the purpose
of enforcing the UAO. 6 TCM further argued that CERCLA was not
intended to allow the EPA or U.S. courts to regulate Canadian
corporations operating in Canada.297 TCM asserted that forcing it to
comply with CERCLA regulations would be an encroachment on
287. Pakootas, No. CV-04-256-AAM, 2004 WL 2578982 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 8,2004).
288. Id. at *5.
289. Id. at *9.
290. Id.
291. Id. at*12, 17.
292. Id. at "5,
293. Id. at *12.
294. Id.
295. Appellant's Opening Brief at 12, Pakootas, No. 05-35153 (9th Cir.June 2, 2005).
296. Id. at 11.
297. Id. at 13.
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the Canadian government's authority to regulate TCM's
operations, and would disrupt the regime of bilateral cooperation
designed to address transboundary disputes.2" TCM also
maintained that CERCLA lacks the requisite clear expression of
congressional intent to overcome the presumption and, therefore,
the company should not be subject to CERCLA enforcement for its
conduct outside of the United States.29
In opposition, the Plaintiffs argued that CERCLA may be applied
to TCM's disposal actions under the "effects doctrine," which
provides that U.S. law applies when a party's actions occur outside
of the United States but cause adverse effects within the United
States.300 TCM's willful release of hazardous substances for almost
100 years caused substantial adverse effects in the Upper Columbia
River Basin and Lake Roosevelt.' Because CERCLA is a remedial
statute, these adverse effects bring TCM within CERCLA's broad
remedial scope for the purpose of conducting RI/FS studies and
implementing necessary cleanup in the United States. Plaintiffs
further argued that they were not attempting to regulate Canadian
operations but instead sought to remedy a "domestic condition," so
there is no risk that Canadian sovereign authority will be
encroached upon. 03
B. NEPA Extraterritoriality: Friends of the Earth v. Watson
1. Factual Origins of the Dispute
In an effort to persuade the Bush administration to take
meaningful action on climate change, Friends of the Earth and
Greenpeace filed a lawsuit to compel the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the Export-Import Bank of
the United States (Ex-Im) to comply with federal environmental
laws.0 4 OPIC and Ex-Im combined have supported over 32 billion
dollars in fossil fuel investments worldwide over the past 10 years.'05
298. Id. at 30.
299. Id. at 32-33.
300. Brief of Appellees at 20-21, Pakootas, No. 05-35153 (9th Cir. July 20, 2005).
301. Id. at 4.
302. Id at 29.
303. Id. at 42.
304. Friends of the Earth v. Watson, No. CV-02-4106-JSW (N.D. Cal. filed Sept. 3, 2002).
305. Id. 48.
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OPIC and Ex-Im supported projects are directly or indirectly
responsible for 8% of the annual worldwide greenhouse gas
emissions-the equivalent of 31.7% of annual U.S. greenhouse gas
emissions. 30 6 The OPIC and Ex-Im projects include many of the
largest new oil field developments in South America, Mexico, the
Caspian region, Southeast Asia, and West Africa, and related
infrastructure such as pipelines, gas processing plants, and oil
refineries. °7 These agencies' projects will result in a combined 32
billion tons of carbon dioxide emissions .3 0 These emissions will be
released by the scores of fossil fuel power projects that these
agencies back, or by the eventual burning of fuels that are being
extracted and transported using Ex-Im and OPIC finances.0 9
Plaintiffs initiated this action pursuant to NEPA and the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 31° seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief.3 1 The lawsuit challenges the agencies' decisions
not to prepare an environmental assessment (EA) under NEPA.
NEPA requires all federal agencies to conduct an environmental
review of programs and project-specific decisions having a
significant effect on the environment. This review requires all
federal agencies to question first if an action will significantly affect
the environment by performing an EA and, if the answer is
affirmative, to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS)
detailing the effects and options for alternative actions: . The
plaintiffs contend that because OPIC and Ex-Im support overseas
energy development projects that result in the release of large
quantities of greenhouse gas emissions, OPIC and Ex-Im are
obligated to prepare an EA to determine whether a significant
313impact on the human environment is caused by these programs.
2. Parties' Arguments to the District Court
On February 11, 2005, Defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment. Defendants contended that Plaintiffs' claims fail for four
reasons: 1) lack of standing; 2) lack of final agency action; 3)
306. PL's Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. for Summ.Jdgmt at 1.
307. PL's Compl. 1 148; 11 162-210.
308. Id. 148.
309. Id.
310. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2005).
311. PL's Compl. 91 212-214.
312. Id. 1 7-8.
313. Id. 938.
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OPIC's organic statute precludes judicial review; and 4) OPIC is
not subject to NEPA 4
First, Defendants asserted that Plaintiffs' concerns regarding the
implications of climate change for the global environment do not
amount to the type of injury that the Supreme Court requires to
support Article III standing.l 5 Defendants contended that Plaintiffs
have not demonstrated an injury in fact, causation, or
redressability. While some of the impacts alleged by Plaintiffs have
been considered as possible results of climate change, there is no
defined link, sufficient for standing purposes, between specific
emissions of greenhouse gases to the atmosphere and the specific
impacts that Plaintiffs alleged. 316 Defendants also argued that
Plaintiffs' injuries are not sufficiently concrete or particularized to
support standing because plaintiffs have not identified injuries that
threaten any particular region of the United States31r and because
there is "no evidence that the specific impacts are likely to occur. 3 18
Defendants further asserted that the chain of causation is too
attenuated to confer standing because most projects would go
forward without OPIC/Ex-Im's involvement, and that the projects'
contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions is minimal. 9
Defendants also contended that Plaintiffs do not meet the
redressability prong of the standing analysis because the
greenhouse gas emissions are too minimal with respect to total
man-made emissions to conclude that a decision by the agencies
not to provide financing or export support for projects would have
any impacts on Plaintiffs. Additionally, even if the agencies decided
to stop financing or supporting the projects, the projects would
likely still go forward with goods and services or financing from
other countries.32 °
314. Def. Mot. for Summ. Jdgmt. at 1, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, Civ. No. 02-
4106 (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 11, 2005). Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. C 02-410JSW,
2005 WL 2035596, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005).
315. Id. at 2.
316. Id. at 12. Among the impacts that Plaintiffs alleged were 1) rising sea levels, which
causes loss of coastal wetlands and increased storm surges; 2) reduced snowpack, which
affects the timing and quantity of water supplies; 3) forest decline due to the significant
increase in and northward shift of insects that damage forests; and 4) a decline in coral reefs.
Pl's Second Amended Complaint, 44-57.
317. Id. at 11.
318. Id. at 13.
319. Def. Mot. for Summ.Jdgmt at 14-21.
320. Id. at 21-22. See O'Boyle Decl. at 1 27; Himberg Decl. at 1 8.
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In response, Plaintiffs maintained that Defendants' position that
"the basic connection between human-induced greenhouse gas
emissions and observed climate change itself has not been
established" was rebutted by Defendants' own administrative
record.32 ' For example, in a recent study, OPIC acknowledged that
"there is a strong and growing scientific consensus that these steady
additions of [greenhouse gases] have tipped a delicate balance and
begun to impact our climate and may be the dominant force
driving recent warming trends. 3 22 Plaintiffs alleged particularized
harm and responded with expert evidence demonstrating the
reasonable probability of increased risk of harm. 32 Additionally,
Plaintiffs' injuries were "actual" and not "remote" because Plaintiffs
not only alleged that the impacts of global warming will occur in
the future, but also that such impacts already affected Plaintiffs'
324interests. The Defendants' assertion that the impacts were too
attenuated has no support, because the entire purpose of financing
oil field development is to bring oil to market for combustion.
Combustion is not only foreseeable, but intended.2
Plaintiffs argued that OPIC and Ex-Im had taken specific final
actions providing the basis for this lawsuit.3 2 6 Plaintiffs sent demand
letters requesting that OPIC and Ex-Im analyze in a NEPA
document whether their respective actions to fund overseas energy
327projects contribute to global warming. In response, each agency
issued a finding in a final report that its actions, both individually
(on a project-by-project basis) and cumulatively (as a portfolio of
similar projects), do not have significant impacts. 328 Each finding is
final: in reliance, OPIC and Ex-Im had not applied NEPA to their
respective actions on either a portfolio-wide basis or in individual
applications for energy projects. However, "neither agency
321. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 19, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Watson, Civ. No. 02-4106 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2005).
322. Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 20, Friends
of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, Civ. No. 02-4106 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2005) (citing OPIC, Climate
Change: Assessing Our Actions at 7, 28 (2000), available at http://www.opic.gov/
pdf/publications/climate report.pdf.
323. Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 20, Friends
of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, Civ. No. 02-4106 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2005).
324. Id.
325. Id. at 1.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 2.
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prepared an EA to support its finding of no significant impact, nor
did they follow required procedures, including response to public
comments and consultation with other federal agencies. 029
3. The District Court's Opinion
In the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, Judge Jeffrey White denied Defendants' motion for
summary judgment on standing and other jurisdictional issues.
The court held that Plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims. 31
The court reasoned that "to demonstrate standing in cases raising
procedural issues, environmental plaintiffs need not show that
substantive environmental harm is imminent,, 332 nor do the
plaintiffs need to present proof that the challenged federal project
will have particular environmental effects.333 Instead, the "'asserted
injury is that environmental consequences might be overlooked' as
a result of deficiencies in the government's analysis under
environmental statutes. 3 4 Consequently, the court held that the
Plaintiffs only needed to demonstrate that "it is reasonably
probable that the challenged action will threaten their concrete
interests.
The court reasoned that while the impact of greenhouse gas
emissions traceable to OPIC and Ex-Im supported projects was not
known with absolute certainty, the only uncertainty Plaintiffs had
was with respect to the severity of consequences, not whether there
would be significant consequences.3 6  Additionally, Plaintiffs
presented evidence that demonstrated that projects supported by
OPIC and Ex-Im were directly or indirectly responsible for one-
third of the total carbon dioxide emissions from the United States
in 2003.33' The court noted that Plaintiffs' evidence, if true, further
demonstrated that: 1) increased greenhouse gases are the major
329. Id.
330. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, Civ. No. 02-4106, 2005 WL 2035596, *1 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 23, 2005).
331. Id at *3.
332. Id. at *2 (citing Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 679 n.4 (9th Cir.
2001)).
333. Id. (citing Citizens for Better Forestry v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 341 F.3d
961, 972 (9th Cir. 2003)).
334. Id. (quoting Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 971-72).
335. Id. (citing Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 969-70).
336. Itt. at *4.
337. Id. at *3 (citing Decl. of Richard Heede, 14).
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factor that caused global warming in the twentieth century; 2)
global warming that has already occurred has had significant
environmental consequences; 3) continued increases in
greenhouse gas emissions would continue to increase global
warming with consequent widespread environmental impacts; and
4) that these impacts affected and will continue to affect areas used
and owned by Plaintiffs.
33 8
In cases involving an alleged procedural injury, the causation and
redressability standards are relaxed once a plaintiff established an
injury in fact.3 9 The court rejected Defendants' arguments that the
causation was too attenuated, despite evidence demonstrating that
generally, "for the large energy-related projects referenced in
Plaintiffs' complaint, third parties have already completed basic
design and planning stages for the projects before applying for
financial support from Ex-Im or OPIC. ' ' 340 Plaintiffs also submitted
"evidence demonstrating a stronger link between the agencies'
assistance and the energy-related projects." For example, Ex-Im
stated that it "'supports export sales that otherwise would not have
gone forward.' 34 ' The court also held that Plaintiffs had sufficiently
demonstrated redressability because, when a plaintiff asserts
inadequacy of a government agency's environmental studies, that it
is sufficient to show that "'the [agency's] decision could be influenced
by the environmental considerations that [the relevant public
statute] requires an agency to study.'
3
The court's decision was narrowly tailored. Judge White simply
ruled that Plaintiffs have standing and that the climate change
lawsuit may proceed. The court did not decide whether the federal
agencies must perform environmental assessments on projects they
fund that contribute to global greenhouse gas emissions. 43 That
issue is likely to be litigated. Still, the decision marks the first time
that a federal court has found standing in a lawsuit exclusively
challenging the federal government's failure to evaluate how its
actions contribute to climate change and how climate change
338. Id. (citing MacCracken Decl., 11 6, 12-39; Dr. Phillip Dustan Decl., 7 5-13;
Randall L. Hayes Decl., 17 5-17; Brian Jeffrey Johnson Decl., 7 10-26; Mark Andre Decl.,
7 5-14; Carol D. Ellinghouse Decl., 77 3-8).
339. Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of 'Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 at 572 n.7 (1992)).
340. Id. at *4 (citing Boyle Decl., 1 41; Harvey Himberg Decl., 1 19).
341. Id. (quoting Ex-Im Administrative Record, Tab 4 at 2 and Tab 5 at 2).
342. Id. (quoting Citizensfor Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 975 (emphasis in original)).
343. Id. at 8.
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impacts affect U.S. citizens.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES BASED ON THE CONTINUUM OF CONTEXT
There is a pressing need to apply an integrated judicial standard
based on the continuum of context to future cases involving the
extraterritorial application of U.S. environmental laws. The
continuum of territorial and non-territorial contexts identified in
Massey can be used as a means through which to understand the
extraterritorial reach of environmental statutes. Reconciling why
Teck Cominco Metals and Watson should yield different outcomes is
perhaps the best vehicle through which to articulate this
continuum of context theory as a reliable judicial standard.
The need for this integrated judicial standard stems first from the
fact that cases addressing the extraterritorial application of U.S.
environmental laws have yielded inconsistent outcomes in the
lower federal courts. Courts have improperly permitted the
extraterritorial application of substantive provisions of U.S.
environmental statutes in territorial contexts3" and have barred the
extraterritorial application of procedural provisions of U.S.
environmental statutes in non-territorial contexts.35
Second, international environmental law lacks adequate
enforcement mechanisms, which creates a need for the aggressive
protection that U.S. environmental laws can offer global commons
resources. An integrated judicial standard would allow for
enhanced protection of global commons resources because foreign
policy concerns are not present when applying U.S. environmental
statutes like NEPA and the ESA to U.S. agency activities that affect
global commons areas. In this context, the extraterritorial
application of U.S. law does not force the hand of a foreign
sovereign.
An integrated judicial standard to govern future cases involving
environmental extraterritoriality should include the following
steps. First, courts must consider whether the statute at issue has a
344. See, e.g., Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV-04-256-AAM,, 2004 WL
2578982 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 2004).
345. See, e.g., NEPA Coalition of Japan v. Aspin, 837 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1993) (holding
that NEPA did not apply to activities at U.S. military bases in Japan because there was a
substantial likelihood that treaty relations with Japan would be affected and because U.S.
foreign policy interests outweighed the benefits of preparing a EIS).
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domestic or international focus. For example, CERCLA has an
unmistakable domestic focus, whereas NEPA and ESA each
expressly embrace an international domain. Second, if the statute
lacks an international focus, then the statute can be applied
extraterritorially only if a) adverse environmental effects are felt in
the U.S. and b) applying the law to another nation would not
create international discord. Almost all environmental statutes that
are domestic in focus like CERCLA would fail on this prong
because, despite possible domestic effects from conduct beyond
U.S. borders, the extraterritorial application of the statute to
conduct that originated on foreign soil would cause international
discord. It is at this juncture that the existing regime of
international environmental law becomes relevant. Global
environmental problems are best resolved in a multilateral,
cooperative manner through international law instruments and
principles, rather than by unilateral application of domestic laws
beyond a nation's borders.
Third, if the statute has an international focus, the court must
scrutinize the statutory provision in question. If the provision
imposes a substantive mandate like the takings prohibition at issue
in Mitchell under the MMPA, it should not be applied
extraterritorially unless such substantive mandate is applied to a
global commons area. If, however, the statutory provision at issue is
procedural-like the consultation requirement under § 7 of the
ESA or the EIS requirement under § 102(2) (C) of NEPA-then the
mandate of the provision should be executed if the area in
question is global commons, and may even be executed under
appropriate circumstances to U.S.-sponsored activities on foreign
soil.
A. The Territorial Context: Transboundary Disputes and Foreign
Sovereign Areas
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Washington improperly held that CERCLA may be applied
extraterritorially to address the pollution from Teck Cominco's
facility that migrated into the United States. CERCLA is a domestic
statute that should not be applied to environmentally detrimental
conduct that originated in Canada and is governed by Canadian
environmental regulations. Even though the effects of the smelter's
conduct have reached U.S. soil, applying CERCLA to resolve this
20061
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dispute would cause international discord between the United
States and Canada and undermine the existing diplomatic and
arbitral options available to resolve such disputes between the two
nations.
The Teck Cominco case is just one of several transboundary
pollution disputes brewing at the U.S.-Canada border. For
example, Alaskan commercial fishermen have opposed a proposal
by a Vancouver company to reopen the Tulsequah Chief mining
complex across the border from Juneau, Alaska.346 The commercial
fishermen are concerned that mining waste could impact fisheries
and that access roads would disturb wild lands.347 Similarly, the sale
of drilling rights for coal-bed methane gas in the Flathead River
Basin north of the Montana border has prompted protests
downstream.348
Canada is not always the cause of these transboundary pollution
concerns, however. For example, a Canadian environmental
organization and the Government of the Province of Manitoba
challenged the North Dakota Department of Health's decision to
grant a permit to Devils Lake Outlet in North Dakota.3 49 The Outlet
is a 208 million dollar project to pump excess water from Devils
Lake, a 125,000-acre lake in northeastern North Dakota, into the
Sheyenne River. 35 " The project could contaminate rivers that feed
Manitoba's Lake Winnipeg. The district court affirmed the
Department of Health's decision to grant the permit for the
Outlet.351 The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district
court, holding that the Department of Health adequately addressed
issues concerning phosphorus, anti-degradation, and the risk of
biota transfer in granting the permit.
352
Extraterritorial application of U.S. environmental statutes-
whether it be CERCLA or other environmental statutes-is an
inappropriate mechanism to resolve transboundary pollution
346. See Todd Wilkinson, US Clashes with Canada Over Pollution at the Border, Christian




349. People to Save the Sheyenne River, Inc. v. North Dakota Dep't of Health, 697
N.W.2d 319, 323 (N.D. 2005).
350. Brief of Appellant in People to Save the Sheyenne River, Inc. v. North Dakota Dep't
of Health, 2005 WL 1520291 (N.D. Mar. 2005).
351. People to Save the Sheyenne River, 697 N.W.2d at 333.
352. Id. at 330-33.
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disputes between bordering nations. The presumption against
extraterritoriality is triggered where application of U.S. laws could
result in international discord. Consequently, U.S. environmental
laws should not govern polluting activity that originates in and is
regulated by sovereign regulatory authorities in Canada or Mexico
because such efforts pose a threat of international discord.
Moreover, the threat of international discord also is evident in that
extraterritorial application of U.S. laws would trump existing
diplomatic and arbitral mechanisms that are in place to resolve
such disputes.
There also are compelling policy reasons for not applying U.S.
environmental laws to our neighbors to the North and South. Such
an approach is bad for U.S. business because it invites retaliation. 4
For instance, if CERCLA is found to apply to TCM's pollution in
Canada that reached the United States, the floodgates of litigation
would be opened for similar suits hauling U.S. businesses into
Canadian courts for the effects of polluting activities that originate
in the United States but have effects in Canada. Not only would
such a scenario wreak havoc on U.S. and Canadian courts, but it
also would cast a dark shadow on U.S. diplomatic relations with its
neighbors.
3 5
There are more appropriate solutions to transboundary
353. International discord is the overriding concern in evaluating extraterritoriality - that
fact that adverse effects are felt in the United States is not sufficient by itself. The Ninth
Circuit in Subafilns rejected an unlimited domestic effects test. Subafilms v. MGM-Pathe
Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir. 1994). The court noted that "courts did
not rest solely on the consequences of a failure to give a statutory scheme extraterritorial
application." Id. (emphasis in original). The court further stated that the likelihood of
unintended international discord if the copyright laws were applied to conduct abroad "fully
justifies application of the Aranco presumption even assuming arguendo that [the foreign
conduct had] 'adverse effects' within the United States." Id. at 1097 (cited in Brief for the
National Mining Association and the National Association of Manufacturers as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellant at 29-30, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Inc., No. 05-35353 (9th
Cir. June 14, 2005)).
354. See Brief for the National Mining Association and the National Association of
Manufacturers as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant at 22, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco
Metals, Inc., No. 05-35353 (9th Cir.June 14, 2005).
355. Similarly, at least one court has addressed the importance of avoiding international
discord between the U.S. and Canada as sovereign neighbors in a NEPA extraterritoriality
case. See Hirt v. Richardson, 127 F. Supp. 2d 833, 849 (W.D. Mich. 1999) (refusing to grant
preliminary injunction on extraterritorial application of NEPA to assess impact of
transporting nuclear material to experimental reactor in Canada due to "the weighty
considerations of United States foreign policy, nuclear non-proliferation, and the general
interests of the Executive office in carrying out United States foreign policy").
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pollution disputes that would avoid the extraterritorial application
of U.S. environmental laws. The most appropriate solution to these
disputes is through diplomatic negotiations between the
governments of the nations in question. Other possible
mechanisms for transboundary pollution disputes are the 1909
Boundary Waters Treaty (U.S.-Canada) 356 the Border
Environmental Cooperation Agreement (U.S.-Mexico) , and the
North American Free Trade Agreement's "Side Agreement" on
Environmental Cooperation. Principles of customary
international law also may be relevant.
3 5
1
For the above stated reasons, the appropriate outcome in Teck
Cominco is for CERCLA not to apply to pollution that originated in
Canada and is regulated by Canadian environmental law.
Regardless of the outcome in Teck Cominco, companies operating in
Canada, the United States, and Mexico would be wise to analyze
the potential cross-border impacts of their operations and assess
the extent to which regulatory authorities, citizen groups, or private
parties in bordering countries may assert claims against them
under applicable domestic laws.
Moving beyond extraterritoriality issues between bordering
nations, the courts in Amlon Metals and ARC Ecology reached the
correct results in considering the extraterritorial application of
RCRA and CERCLA, respectively, because these courts were faced
with straightforward scenarios that also presented a risk of
international discord. In Amlon Metals, the requirements of RCRA
were sought to be applied to a shipment of waste to England.
Similarly, ARC Ecology involved the application of CERCLA to
356. See Austen L. Parrish, Trail Smelter D4jii Vu: Extraterritoriality, International
Environmental Law, and the Search for Solutions to Canadian-U.S. Transboundary Water Pollution
Disputes, 85 B.U. L. REV. 363, 414-428 (2005).
357. Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the
Environment in the Border Area, Aug. 14, 1983, U.S.-Mex., 235 U.S.T. 2916.
358. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation Between the United
States, Canada, and Mexico, 32 I.L.M. 1480 (Sept. 14, 1993). The Side Agreement created
the Commission on Environmental Cooperation, which established a process for citizens and
non-governmental organizations to raise concerns about the enforcement of environmental
laws in all three member countries.
359. See Brian R. Popiel, Comment, From Customary Law to Environmental Impact Assessment:
A New Approach to Avoiding Transboundary Environmental Damage Between Canada and the United
States, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 447, 474 (1995) (proposing that the customary
international law principle sic utere, which provides that no nation may permit the use of its
territory to cause environmental damage to the territory of another state, may be applied in
transboundary pollution disputes to find state responsibility).
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activities in the Philippines; however, the facts were somewhat less
clear cut than in Amlon Metals because ARC Ecology involved
activities at a former U.S. military base on Filipino soil.
Amlon Metals and ARC Ecology were properly decided, however,
because the United States did not have any degree of control over
the areas in question. Moreover, both statutes do not contain
language indicating that Congress intended them to apply outside
the United States. Applying these U.S. environmental statutes to
such contexts would amount to environmental imperialism and
would cause international discord between the United States and
the host nations.
The scenario in Mitchell under the MMPA was a closer call, but
the court still reached the proper result. Although the dolphins
sought to be protected were entitled to such protection under the
MMPA, applying the MMPA to the taking of dolphins by an
American citizen when the dolphins were in Bahamian territorial
waters would cause international discord between the U.S. and the
Bahamas. The Bahamian government has an indisputable right of
sovereign control over the dolphins within its territorial waters, free
from unwelcome intrusion from the command of U.S.
environmental statutes.
B. The Non-Territorial Context: Global Commons Areas and the EEZ
Global commons areas are fundamentally different from the
scenarios discussed above for transboundary pollution and foreign
sovereign territory. Extraterritorial application of U.S.
environmental laws to global commons areas like Antarctica, the
high seas, and even the U.S. EEZ does not present international
discord concerns. Antarctica and the high seas are not within
another nation's sovereign control, and the U.S. has some degree
of shared sovereign interest and control over these areas. Similarly,
as discussed in Navy, extraterritorial application of NEPA in the
EEZ also is appropriate because the degree of control that the U.S.
has over this area is not territorial control but resembles the degree
of interest and control that the U.S. may exert in global commons
areas.
A more challenging issue is presented, as in Watson, when
NEPA's effect will be felt within the territory of a foreign sovereign.
Cases that have addressed this scenario have been limited to
military contexts. Courts have held that because military contexts
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involve such a heavy overlay of U.S. foreign policy interests, NEPA
should not apply extraterritorially in such situations. 360 These cases
represent a justifiably narrow exception to the continuum of
context theory. When U.S. military interests are not at issue,
however, NEPA's EIS requirement should apply extraterritorially
only when global commons areas are at issue.
Watson should be resolved to confirm that NEPA is a procedurally
focused statute that contains express congressional intent to have a
worldwide reach. It should be applied to address the impacts of
global climate change for the following reasons: 1) there is no
concern about clashes with foreign sovereignty because the agency
decisions are made on U.S. soil, and 2) even if sovereignty clashes
are felt indirectly in the countries in which these projects are
located, the extraterritorial application of NEPA should be
permitted on policy grounds to help reduce the possible impacts of
global climate change. The Earth's atmosphere can be considered
a global commons like Antarctica and the high seas because it is an
area in which all nations have a conservational interest, but no
nation has territorial control from which to assert such a right. This
conclusion is consistent with the Massey court's reasoning to allow
NEPA to apply to address possible impacts to the fragile global
commons environment of Antarctica.
Similarly, the applicability of the ESA consultation requirement
in § 7 would pose minimal international discord, if any. Section 7
of the Act is intended to protect species worldwide by regulating
U.S. agency consultation to ensure such protection, which, like
NEPA, is an appropriate and non-invasive mechanism to protect
global commons resources that are undeniably in the interest of all.
The Eighth Circuit in Lujan I so held, but the U.S. Supreme Court
declined to reach the merits of the extraterritoriality issue in Lujan
360. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n
("NRDC v. NRC"), 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that NEPA did not apply to the
NRC's approval of the export of a nuclear reactor to the Philippines because of the "unique
foreign policy interests arising in the nuclear energy and non proliferation contexts"); NEPA
Coalition of Japan v. Aspin, 837 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1993) (holding that NEPA did not
apply to activities at U.S. military bases in Japan because there was a substantial likelihood
that treaty relations with Japan would be affected and because U.S. foreign policy interests
outweighed the benefits of preparing a EIS); Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749 (D.
Haw. 1990) (holding that NEPA did not apply to the removal of munitions from their
stockpile and transportation within Germany because "extraterritorial application of
NEPA... would result in a lack of respect for Germany's sovereignty, authority, and control
over actions taken within its borders").
Vol. 31:1
Extraterritorial Application: A Proposal
II because it dismissed the case for lack of standing.
CONCLUSION
The globalization of commerce requires an increasingly vigilant
global environmental protection response. The extraterritorial
application of U.S. environmental statutes can bootstrap
international environmental protection goals if such statutes meet
the elements of the integrated standard based on the continuum of
context. To meet this standard, a court must conclude either that
the statute at issue has an international focus, or that a domestically
focused statute involves a situation that poses adverse domestic
effects and no threat of international discord. If the statute has an
international focus, the court also must scrutinize the statutory
provision in question. If the provision imposes a substantive
mandate like the takings prohibition at issue in Mitchell under the
MMPA, it should not be applied extraterritorially unless such
substantive mandate is applied to a global commons area. If,
however, the statutory provision at issue is procedural-like the
consultation requirement under the § 7 of the ESA or the EIS
requirement under § 102(2) (C) of NEPA-then the mandate of
the provision should be executed if the area sought to be protected
is global commons, even if foreign sovereigns feel indirect effects
from such an application of U.S. law.
Therefore, the continuum of context standard confirms that
NEPA's EIS requirement and the ESA's § 7 consultation
requirement should be applied extraterritorially because 1) they
meet the criteria listed above, and 2) they provide much needed
mechanisms to help promote international environmental
protection objectives that are rarely more than aspirational as
contained in international environmental law instruments.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit will
have the first opportunity to apply the continuum of context theory
to hold that 1) CERCLA should not apply extraterritorially in Teck
Cominco and, 2) if the case is appealed from the Northern District
of California, that NEPA should apply extraterritorially in Watson.
Both of these cases will likely be appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court may have an opportunity in
the near future to embrace the continuum of context theory as a
viable mechanism for resolving disputes involving the
extraterritoriality of U.S. environmental statutes.
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